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Abstract: The thesis of discontinuity between humans and nonhumans
requires evidence from formal reasoning tasks that rules out solutions
based on associative strategies. However, insightful problem solving can
be often credited through talking to humans, but not to nonhumans.
We note the paradox of assuming that reasoning is orthogonal to
language and enculturation while employing the criterion of using
language to compare what humans and nonhumans know.
According to Penn et al., there is substantial evidence for discon-
tinuity between human and nonhuman minds. They claim that
“a distinctively human, modular system for approximating a
LoT [language of thought] – that is, one that subserves higher-
order, role-governed relational representations in a systematic
and domain-general fashion – has evolved on top of and
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reinterprets the output of the proto-symbolic systems we still
share with other animals” (sect. 11, para. 9, emphasis in original).
A good part of their article aims to show that research pointing to
nonhuman symbolic functioning in areas such as the ability to
make transitive inferences or to demonstrate theory of mind
reasoning can be best interpreted in terms of associative rule
learning rather than evidence for insightful understanding
similar to that of humans. The problem, though, is that their
only apparent criterion by which nonhumans could be credited
with higher cognition is through language. This criterion
creates a paradoxical circularity in their argument, one that is
not restricted to comparative psychology but has been long
noted to be present in research on human cognitive
development.
In this sense, the circularity of Penn et al.’s position resembles
that in Piaget’s theory (see Lourenc¸o & Machado 1996; Siegal
1999; 2008). In Piaget’s clinical method, thinking is assessed
through language even though thinking is held to be genetically
prior to language. According to this account, children who
cannot justify their answers on measures such as those involving
transitive inferences cannot be credited with having the necess-
ary knowledge that the premises, if A . B and B . C, must
lead to the conclusion that A . C, and that this conclusion is a
logical one which is independent of empirical verification. This
standard of evidence means that children need to demonstrate
proficiency in verbal ability to be counted as having the ability
to respond correctly. So support for Piaget’s theory has often
been subject to the criticism that it is riddled with false negative
results, of demonstrating that children lack logic and symbolic
functioning when they often do show it in their everyday beha-
vior. Similarly, adults in developing cultures may also appear to
demonstrate a lack of competence on some formal tests that
does not correspond to their highly adaptive intelligence.
Penn et al. describe evidence based on experiments and obser-
vations of nonhumans that would seem to be consistent with
Darwin’s continuity thesis. For example, crows, pigeons, and
fish all show behavior that would seem to indicate a grasp of tran-
sitive inferences. However, Penn et al. prefer to dismiss this evi-
dence in terms of training, reinforcement history, and low-level
associational learning mechanisms that are independent of an
understanding of logical relations. But on this basis, we could
not credit the ability to perform transitive inferences to many
humans. In common with crows, pigeons, and fish, children at
an early age very clearly do show behavior that would seem to
indicate a grasp of transitive inferences. However, they do not
have the means to justify this behavior. Instead, they may order
objects “logically” based on spatial imagery strategies and
without the explicit use of logic (Pears & Bryant 1990). Although
Penn et al. and Piagetians may not be ready to credit children and
many adults with the abilities to solve transitive inference tasks
unless they can verbalize a rationale to the effect of “because A
is greater (or taller or longer) than B and B is greater than C,
then A must be greater than C,” it is seems entirely acceptable
that the use of spatial imagery is a valid way to solve such tasks.
It amounts to an alternative adaptive solution that serves the
organism very well in a range of domains.
Similarly, birds such as scrub-jays and certain nonhuman pri-
mates show behavior that would seem to indicate a theory of
mind reasoning in the form of understanding how conspecifics
can be misled after having been imbued with false beliefs
about the location of food. However, Penn et al. dismiss this evi-
dence as falling short of their criterion for genuine theory of mind
reasoning: requiring a demonstration that the animal can attri-
bute mental state content to other agents and use this content
in a “theory-like fashion” to predict behavior based on agents’
mental states. Without providing a way for animals without
language to demonstrate the possession of this theory, Penn
et al. again prefer to interpret evidence for theory of mind
(ToM) in nonhumans as evidence for a pattern of behavior
created through training and reinforcement instead of based on
insightful reasoning. This interpretation is close to that provided
by Perner and Ruffman (2005) in dismissing the depth of nonver-
bal infants’ ToM understanding as shown through patterns of
visual attention devoted to the unexpected behavior shown by
an agent with a false belief (Onishi & Baillargeon 2005).
Despite all this, it is abundantly clear that human infants have a
substantial understanding of reality and the phenomenal world of
reality as through the rational imitation of an agents’ behavior
(Gergely et al. 2002) – an ability shared to some substantial
extent by chimpanzees (Buttelmann et al. 2007). Penn et al.’s
proposal that humans are likely to undergo some sort of radical
restructuring in their thinking and reasoning that does not
occur in nonhumans needs to be reassessed. There are many
other possibilities. For example, both humans and nonhumans
could instead undergo some sort of “executive functioning”
(EF) development. At a certain point, they now attend to the
correct response – but humans, unlike nonhumans, can give
verbal justifications to an experimenter for why this response is
correct. It may of course be that humans undergo a more soph-
isticated EF development than do nonhumans. They also have
access to language that alerts them to the pragmatic nature of
the inferential reasoning that is required for task success. Ulti-
mately, advances in brain scanning and eye-tracking techniques,
as well as in the use of miniaturized video cameras for studying
undisturbed behavior in natural surroundings (Rutz et al.
2007), may substantiate further both what young children and
nonhumans know. In the meantime, Penn et al.’s verdict, “non-
human animals didn’t (and still don’t) get it” (sect. 11.2, para.
4) is clearly premature.
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